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Abstract 
Humans can perform several different tasks on the same set of 
stimuli in rapid alternation.  Each task, signaled by a distinct 
task cue, may require the classification of stimuli using a 
different stimulus attribute. However, such "task switching" 
performance comes at a cost, as expressed by weaker 
performance when switching rather than repeating tasks. This 
cost is often claimed to be the consequence of a mental 
reorientation away from the previous task and towards the 
new task, requiring executive control of behavior. 
Alternatively, task switching could simply be based on the 
retrieval of different cue-stimulus-response associations. In 
this experiment, pigeons learned go-left/go-right 
discriminations between grating patterns according to either 
their spatial frequency or their orientation, depending on the 
color of the pattern (the task cue). When humans solved the 
same tasks on the basis of verbalizable rules, they responded 
more slowly and made more errors on trials where they had to 
switch between tasks than when repeating the same task. 
Pigeons did not show this "switch cost"; but like humans, 
their performance was significantly worse when the response 
(left or right) to a given stimulus varied between tasks than 
when it stayed the same (the “congruency effect”). Larger 
effects of both switch costs and congruency were observed in 
humans learning the tasks by trial and error. We discuss the 
potential driving factors behind these very different patterns 
of performance for both humans and pigeons.  
Keywords: executive control; associative learning; task 
switching; humans; pigeons; comparative cognition. 
Introduction 
Humans are able to perform two or more different tasks on 
the same stimulus material when cued to do so (called “task 
switching”). Typically, each task requires the classification 
of a set of stimuli according to a different stimulus attribute. 
The task that is to be performed in a given trial is indicated 
by a specific task cue (for example, subjects might be asked 
to judge a grating pattern by its spatial frequency when the 
color yellow is presented, or to classify the same stimulus 
according to whether it is vertically or horizontally 
orientated when the color red appears).  
However, it is still a matter of debate which cognitive 
mechanisms underlie human task-switching ability. Humans 
may classify the stimuli they see based on rules, and a 
common phenomenon of task switching, namely longer 
reaction times and higher error rates after switching tasks 
compared to repeating the same task (“switch costs”), has 
been assumed to reflect the executive control processes 
associated with this rule use. For example, humans might 
sort a series of stimuli based on their orientation while 
ignoring other available stimulus dimensions such as spatial 
frequency. In this context, switching from one task to the 
next involves executive control when identifying the current 
task, retrieving its specific stimulus-response rules into one's 
working memory (while deleting the rules of the previous 
task) and adjusting one's response reaction to the new 
requirements: in short, a mental disengagement from the 
previous task and preparation for the currently relevant task, 
known as "task-set reconfiguration" (Vandierendonck, 
Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010). Switch costs are thought 
to reflect the need for such reconfiguration in switch trials 
but not in repeat trials, for which the task-set is already 
available (Monsell, 2003). 
But, if we believe that humans have multiple processes 
available that support learning (McLaren, Green & 
Mackintosh, 1994), task-switching phenomena might be the 
result of associative learning mechanisms, i.e., the retrieval 
of cue-stimulus-response associations (Logan & Bundesen, 
2003). Learning to respond correctly in a task-switching 
paradigm could be accomplished by associating the overall 
appearance of a stimulus with a certain response (Lea & 
Wills, 2008). Each stimulus could be categorized by using 
its combined dimensions and comparing its similarity to a 
stimulus to which the correct response is known.  
A task-switching phenomenon often observed in addition 
to switch costs, the effects of stimulus congruency (Monsell, 
Yeung & Azuma, 2000), might indeed be better explained 
by associative learning processes than task-set 
reconfiguration. As each task makes use of the same set of 
multidimensional stimuli, stimulus values on individual 
dimensions can be defined as either congruent or 
incongruent in relation to the correct response towards them. 
If a stimulus is congruent, it always requires the same 
response regardless of the current task; learning to 
discriminate between different congruent stimuli thus takes 
the form of a component discrimination, in which the 
correct response depends on a single element of a 
multidimensional stimulus. However, when an incongruent 
stimulus is shown, the correct response varies depending on 
the current task in the manner of a biconditional 
discrimination. Given that there is good evidence that such 
discriminations are difficult to learn (Harris & Livesey, 
2008), it is no surprise that on trials in which a congruent 
stimulus is shown, reaction time and error rate are distinctly 
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lower compared to trials with an incongruent stimulus, and 
humans can exhibit large congruency effects (Monsell, 
Yeung & Azuma, 2000). Experiments intended to elicit an 
associative approach to task switching in humans, either by 
only providing cue-stimulus-response contingencies instead 
of full task instructions or by forcing participants to learn 
how to respond by trial and error, have yielded very large 
congruency effects and switch costs that were considerably 
smaller than the effects of congruency (Forrest, Elchlepp, 
Monsell & McLaren, 2012). 
Humans can communicate the extent to which they refer 
to certain rules when reacting to a stimulus. It is therefore 
potentially possible to identify a group of participants who 
learned the responses based on rules about the stimulus 
dimensions and those who did not, and compare their 
performance to that of animals, who might not have the 
same cognitive mechanisms available.  
Stoet and Snyder (2003) were the first to explicitly 
investigate task-switching effects in nonhuman animals. 
Their two rhesus macaques behaved very similarly to 
Forrest et al.'s (2012) humans who were presumed to be 
learning associatively: while their performance produced a 
large congruency effect, switch costs were rather small, and 
in fact absent in one animal. Stoet and Snyder (2003) 
acknowledged that monkeys might lack at least one of the 
cognitive control mechanisms necessary to solve task-
switching paradigms in the typical human way, but they did 
not doubt that their subjects used some form of executive 
control. However, the possibility remains that both humans 
and nonhuman animals might solve a task-switching 
paradigm associatively. 
If humans who claim to be unaware of any rules 
underlying a task-switching paradigm employ an approach 
similar to that in animals assumedly solving the task by 
purely associative processes, such as the pigeon 
(Mackintosh, 1988), their performance would be expected to 
resemble that of those animals. For this purpose, pigeons 
might make a more suitable comparison than primates; they 
can also be tested in larger numbers than monkeys, so more 
reliable results should be obtained. 
To design a paradigm suitable for use with both humans 
and animals, instead of relying on language-based stimuli or 
cues, we used varying values of the visual dimensions of 
color, orientation and spatial frequency to indicate a correct 
response. Additionally, we used trial-and-error training on 
cues and stimuli that resembled the conditioning procedures 
usually employed in animal testing. To investigate whether 
human performance under these conditions can be compared 
to that based entirely on associative-learning processes, we 
trained humans and pigeons on the same paradigm. 
Method 
Subjects 
Twenty-four Psychology undergraduate students, in 
exchange for course credit, and eight pigeons (Columbia 
livia) participated in this experiment. Pigeons were kept in 
an indoor aviary (2 x 1 x 2.5m) that housed 15 pigeons at 
the time of the experiment. They were maintained at or 
above 80% of their free-feeding weight. Both humans and 
pigeons were naïve to the testing stimuli, though pigeons 
had previously been trained to peck at a white observing key 
presented in the center of a black touch-sensitive display, 
followed by a peck at a red, blue, green or yellow colored 
circle appearing in the same position, and finally, to peck at 
a white reward key randomly presented either to the left or 
to the right of the display. 
Apparatus 
All experiments were carried out inside the Washington 
Singer Laboratories at the University of Exeter. Pigeons 
were tested in one of eight identical 71 x 50.5 x 43.5cm 
operant chambers. Each pigeon was always tested in the 
same chamber. One of the long walls of the chamber was 
fitted with a 31 x 23.5cm (15") touch monitor (Model 
1547L 1024x768pxl TFT monitor, CarrollTouch infrared 
detector, ELO Touchsystems Inc.) mounted 12cm above the 
grid floor of the chamber. Two 2.8 Watt white houselights 
were mounted to either side above the screen; below the 
screen, mounted 4cm above the chamber floor and directly 
below each house light, two 6x5cm apertures gave access to 
grain hoppers when solenoids were activated. The food 
hoppers were illuminated by a 2.8 Watt light when activated 
and contained a 2:1 mixture of hemp seed and conditioner. 
Also mounted below the screen between the two food 
hoppers, a 50 Ohm loudspeaker played white noise into the 
box as well as indicating effective pecks to target areas with 
an immediate beep. The interior of the box was monitored 
by a video camera attached to the short wall of the chamber 
opposite the chamber door. Contingencies were controlled 
and data collected using a PC computer running the Whisker 
system (Cardinal & Aitken, 2010) with client programs 
written in Visual Basic 6.0. Humans were tested in a small 
experimental room on an iMac. The program was written in 
MatLab R2008b® using the Psychtoolbox (Kleiner, 
Brainard & Pelli, 2007) add-on and run using 
MatLab2011b®. 
Procedure 
For pigeons, each trial began with the presentation of an 
observing key (100 pixels in diameter) presented in the 
center of a black display. Following two pecks at the 
observing key, it was replaced by one of four task cues, a 
color-filled circle of 200 pixels in diameter, in the display 
center. Each of the two tasks was associated with two 
distinct cues: these were blue or yellow for task A, and red 
or green for task B. For humans, a trial started immediately 
with the presentation of the cue; that is, no observing key 
was presented. Pigeons had to peck the task cue twice, after 
which the task stimulus appeared, superimposed on the cue, 
making both the cue and the stimulus visible 
simultaneously. Humans were asked to mouse-click once on 
the cue, upon which the stimulus appeared in the same way 
as for pigeons. 
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Stimuli, made up as circular Gaussian patches of 200 
pixels in diameter, consisted of one of four sinusoidal 
grating patterns, differing from another in two dimensions: 
spatial frequency - either low (2 cycles per 100 pixels 
(c/100px) for pigeons and 3 c/100px for humans) or high 
(12 c/100px for pigeons and 10 c/100px for humans) - and 
line orientation - either horizontal or vertical. All 
combinations of cue color, spatial frequency and orientation 
were used, resulting in 16 visually distinct images. 
The correct response towards a stimulus depended on the 
task. For example, for some participants, task A required 
responding to the spatial frequency of the grating pattern, 
e.g., if a stimulus, regardless of the orientation of the 
pattern, had a low spatial frequency, the correct response 
towards this stimulus was to choose the left reward location, 
while stimuli with a high spatial frequency afforded 
choosing the right reward location. Conversely, in task B, 
stimuli would have to be classified according to the 
orientation of the grating pattern, regardless of its spatial 
frequency. That is, if a stimulus showed a horizontal pattern, 
it required a response to the left reward location, while a 
vertical pattern indicated a response to the right location as 
the correct one. Although blue and yellow were always 
assigned to task A, the stimulus attributes (spatial frequency 
or orientation) that were important for classification in task 
A and the reward location that was associated with any cue-
stimulus combination were counterbalanced across pigeons 
and across humans. As each stimulus always contained both 
spatial frequency and orientation information, some stimuli 
always required the same response, e.g., a horizontal pattern 
of low spatial frequency might always require a left 
response regardless of the current task. In addition to these 
congruent stimuli, responses to incongruent ones depended 
on the task at hand, for example, a horizontal stimulus with 
a high spatial frequency pattern might require a response to 
the left reward location on the orientation task but a 
response to the right location if the spatial frequency was to 
be judged. 
For pigeons, pecking twice at the composite stimulus in 
the display center resulted in it being deleted from the center 
and simultaneously reappearing 200 pixels to the left and to 
the right of the display center as response keys. Pigeons 
made a final response by choosing the correct reward 
location (left or right) by pecking at the stimulus presented 
on that side. The two response keys were effective between 
3 and 6 seconds after the onset of their presentation, after 
which a single peck at the correct key resulted in the 
activation of the corresponding food magazine for 2.5 
seconds. During training only, if a pigeon developed a 
position bias, i.e., showed a strong tendency to peck one of 
the two response keys, responses to the more attended side 
were made ineffective for one to two (or more if necessary) 
seconds longer than to the less attended side. The release of 
the food magazine ended a trial. The inter-trial-interval to 
the next presentation of the observing key lasted between 15 
and 30 seconds. Human participants were asked to mouse-
click on the stimulus in the center of the screen, which led to 
the appearance of two square, white response keys to the left 
and right side of the stimulus; the stimulus also remained on 
display. Participants responded to the stimulus by clicking 
on the response key that was associated with the present 
cue-stimulus combination. If the correct response key was 
chosen, the stimulus and response keys disappeared from 
the screen and the word "Correct" appeared in white letters 
next to a golden star for two seconds before the next trial 
began. If the wrong response key was clicked, the entire 
display was replaced by the phrase "WRONG!" in white 
letters. Participants were asked to respond as quickly as 
possible while making as few mistakes as possible. 
Training Both pigeons and human participants received 
training on each task separately before attempting the task-
switching paradigm. The order in which the tasks were 
learned was counterbalanced across individuals of each 
species. 
Pigeons received daily training sessions of 3 blocks of 24 
trials each, showing each possible combination of the two 
cues of the task to be trained and the different variations of 
spatial frequency and orientation three times per block. The 
first block included a 25th trial (a repeat of the first trial of 
the session), as that first trial was not included in analyses, 
resulting in 73 trials per day in total. The order of cue-
stimuli combinations was randomized within blocks. 
Discrimination of the stimuli was considered successful if 
the pigeon responded correctly on at least 80% of trials 
within a daily training session, in at least three consecutive 
sessions. Pigeons thus received a minimum of 3 sessions, or 
219 trials, on a task before starting training on the other 
task. The number of sessions on each task was gradually 
reduced until pigeons were able to switch between tasks 
from one day to the next and still perform at or above 80% 
correct responses in each session. For humans, training on 
each separate task was carried out in four blocks of trials. A 
block was considered successful if subjects reached the 
criterion of 80% or more correct responses in the previous 
trials that included each stimulus at least twice. Thus, the 
criterion was based on at least eight consecutive trials, two 
for each of the four different combinations of spatial 
frequency and orientation. The first training block of a task 
contained at least 32 trials, then, the second task was trained 
in at least 32 trials. After this, the first task was repeated for 
a minimum of another 16 trials until criterion was reached; 
finally, the second task was repeated for at least 16 trials 
until the participant reached criterion in this fourth and final 
training block. 
Test Once each task was trained separately to success 
criterion, subjects entered the task-switching part of the 
experiment, in which task A and task B trials were 
intermingled. The task sequence was partially randomized 
to produce a switch trial in one third of the trials; for non-
switch trials, the two task cues alternated so that the same 
cue was never shown for two trials in a row. Pigeons 
received 20 sessions of 73 trials each, or 1460 trials in total; 
in each block, the four combinations of spatial frequency 
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and orientation were presented three times per task. Humans 
completed 24 blocks of 25 trials, a total of 600 trials, in the 
same manner as described above, with each of the 
combinations occurring twice on a task-repeat trial and once 
on a task-switch trial per two blocks. After completion of 
the task-switching procedure, we determined, via a 
questionnaire, which approach they used to solve the 
experiment and assessed their ability to describe the rules 
that defined a correct response. If a participant was able to 
correctly identify the contingencies between a task cue and 
certain stimulus characteristics, he or she was considered to 
have understood and successfully applied the underlying 
rule. If participants could not explain any relationship 
between stimuli, cues and the correct response, this was 
taken as an indication that they had not used task rules. 
Results 
The only basis for comparing the two species was accuracy 
(errors) when choosing a response key, as it was not 
possible to obtain an accurate estimation of response 
latencies for pigeons, although we did record each subject's 
latency to peck/click on a response key. Restricting pigeons' 
time to respond would have required differential 
reinforcement of short response latencies, which could 
potentially have impaired learning of the cue-stimulus-
response contingencies. Thus, all results reported are for 
error rates when making a response. We ran four of the 
birds on ten more sessions with a strongly reduced inter-trial 
interval after they had completed the main study to assess 
whether allowing for unrestricted response times potentially 
decreased any effects, and this yielded similar results to 
those reported below. Nevertheless, the possibility remains 
that the particular timing requirements of the task we used 
may play an important role in producing our results. 
For the human data, we calculated participants' error rate 
when choosing a response key as a percentage for each pair 
of consecutive blocks, i.e., for 48 trials (the first trial of each 
block was excluded from analysis, since it was neither a 
switch nor a repeat trial), resulting in 12 block pairs per 
participant. Pigeons' performance was calculated for each of 
the 20 sessions, excluding the first trial of each session. 
The different training methods we employed for humans 
and pigeons resulted in substantially lower error rates for 
pigeons. However, while it was necessary to train pigeons to 
produce error rates below 20% throughout, we were 
reluctant to give more training to humans as it would have 
increased the chances of humans inferring the task rules. As 
it was, nine of the 24 human participants were able to 
verbalize the rules for both tasks at the end of the 
experiment. A further eight reported having discovered one 
of the two rules or having made up their own solving 
strategies. Because of the ambiguity as to what mechanisms 
these participants relied on to solve the tasks, we did not 
include their data in any further analyses. The remaining 
seven participants stated that they were not aware of any 
relationships between the stimuli and the correct response, 
and it is these participants that most naturally allow 
comparison with performance by the pigeons on this task. 
To investigate the extent to which both humans and 
pigeons were influenced by switch costs or congruency 
effects, we conducted a 3-way repeated measure ANOVA 
using Switch/Repeat Trials, Stimulus Congruency and 
Block Pair Sequence/Session as within-subject factors. 
Analyses were carried out separately for humans, according 
to the number of rules humans could name (No Rule and 2 
Rules) and for pigeons. F and p values for the effects 
mentioned below are reported in Table 1. All results were 
subjected to Huynh-Feldt correction. 
Humans received an average of 137 trials before entering 
the task-switching stage; pigeons entered the test phase after 
an average of 109 training sessions. Since the pigeons had 
received substantially longer training, we conducted all 
analyses on the the first half of the sessions as well as on the 
full data set, to rule out potential floor effects. Results were 
the same for both data sets as the pigeons did not 
significantly improve their performance over time; 
accordingly, the results reported are from the full data set of 
20 sessions. 
Performance of humans was influenced by whether they 
were able to verbalize the discrimination rules or not; error 
rates were significantly lower for people who were able to 
verbalize both tasks (2 Rules; M=12.1%, SD=2.0) than if 
No Rule (M=36.1%, SD=2.3) had been inferred (F(1, 14)= 
62.20, p<.001). Pigeons' error rates were low (M=9.1%, 
SD=3.7), due to the amount of they received. 
Table 1: Overall F and p values for Switch/Repeat Trials, Stimulus Congruency, Block Pair Sequence/Sessions, and 
significant interactions between factors for humans depending on the number of rules they named and for pigeons. P values 
below .05 are marked in bold. 
 Both Rules (N=9) No Rules (N=7) Pigeons (N=8) 
Factor F (df) p F (df) p F (df) p 
Block Pairs/Sessions 8.92 (11, 88) <.001 0.59 (11, 66) .720 1.04 (19, 133) .413 
Switch/Repeat 57.29 (1, 8) <.001 18.83 (1, 6) .005 0.13 (1, 7) .731 
Stimulus Congruency 68.06 (1, 8) <.001 19.10 (1,6) .005 71.03 (1, 7) <.001 
       
Session * Switch 2.98 (11, 88) .002 0.38 (11, 66) .574 0.62 (19, 133) .885 
Session * Congruency 3.68 (11, 88) .002 1.42 (11, 66) .222 1.37 (19, 133) .155 
Switch * Congruency 14.18 (1, 8) .005 10.69 (1, 6) .017 0.55 (1, 7) .484 
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Figure 1: Stimulus congruency effects (difference in error 
rates between incongruent and congruent stimuli) in trials in 
which the task repeats and those in which it switches from 
the previous trial, and across all trials ('Total'). 
The factor of Stimulus Congruency strongly influenced 
performance for all groups; human participants and pigeons 
made more errors when faced with incongruent stimuli than 
when dealing with congruent ones (Figure 1, 'Total'). 
Similarly, there was a highly significant effect of the 
factor Switch/Repeat for humans regardless of the number 
of rules verbalized: they performed less well on switch 
trials, which required executing the opposite task to the one 
on the previous trial, than on repeat trials (Figure 2, 'Total'). 
However, while the effect was present in both human 
groups, pigeons demonstrated a noticeable lack of switch 
costs (Figure 2, 'Total'). 
All human participants showed significantly higher switch 
costs on trials with incongruent stimuli than on those trials 
in which the stimulus was congruent, i.e. there was a 
significant interaction between the two factors for all three 
human groups (Figure 2). 
The sequence of Block Pairs (or Sessions for pigeons) 
was reliable for 2-Rules users only, implying that these 
participants learned to make fewer mistakes as the 
experiment carried on, while No-Rule users and pigeons 
maintained their initial level of performance throughout. For 
those participants who were able to verbalize the two rules, 
both the effects of Switch/Repeat trials and Stimulus 
Congruency declined over the course of the experiment, i.e., 
this group experienced interaction effects of Block Pairs 
with the two other main factors. 
Although not relevant for the species comparisons, it can be 
noted that, in their reaction times, human showed a similar 
pattern to what has previously been observed in humans 
using different learning approaches (Forrest et al., 2012); 
that is, those who inferred both rules suffered from switch 
costs much more (M=149.70ms) than from congruency 
effects (M=94.78ms), whereas humans who did not use any 
rules were largely affected by congruency effects 
(M=50.34ms) but barely showed any costs in switching 
between tasks (M=0.58ms). 
 
Figure 2: Switch cost (difference in error rates between task 
switch trials and task repeat trials) for congruent and 
incongruent stimuli, and overall ('Total'). 
Discussion 
Forrest et al. (2012) showed that humans in the cue-
stimulus-response (no rule) condition of their task-switching 
experiment expressed reduced switch costs and larger 
congruency effects relative to a Tasks group that were told 
both of the applicable rules at the start of the experiment. 
They offer this as a "signature" of associatively-based 
performance on this type of task. We are not in a position to 
make a direct comparison with their study, as we did not run 
an equivalent of their Tasks group. Our 2-Rules participants 
are perhaps an approximation to this group, but had to 
induce the rules, and were not instructed to apply them. 
However, these participants demonstrated significant switch 
costs and exhibited a congruency effect, similar to the 
effects usually found when humans are informed of the task 
rules before engaging in a task-switching paradigm. This 
group was the only one that significantly decreased their 
error rates over the course of the experiment; it can be 
assumed that this was due to participants "figuring out the 
tasks": during the first few blocks, performance essentially 
matched that of No-Rule users, but then it dramatically 
improved to a level similar to the performance of the 
pigeons, i.e., at error rates of 10% or less. A third of 
participants were unable to report any task rules; these 
might instead be classified as employing an associative 
approach to task switching. In addition to a generally high 
error rate, solving the tasks without any knowledge of their 
underlying rules had considerable impact on the magnitude 
of typical task-switching phenomena: while a stimulus's 
congruency only moderately affected performance in those 
who used both rules, it heavily influenced humans' ability to 
solve the tasks if they had been unaware of the rules. This 
comes to no surprise, as it will always be easier, especially 
in regard to associative learning, to learn the correct 
response to a given stimulus when it is the same in both 
tasks - that is, when that stimulus is congruent - than when it 
varies between tasks, as it does for incongruent stimuli. 
Clearly, there is a significant congruency effect in the 
pigeon data and no cost of switching between tasks. Similar 
levels - a much bigger congruency effect than switch costs - 
are also observed in the No-Rule humans and in Forrest et 
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al.'s (2012) study. The typical signature for a task-based 
approach in humans instructed to use tasks is the reverse, a 
larger switch cost and a smaller congruency effect. Further 
research will establish if this true of the tasks used here. 
Although we can draw parallels between the performance 
of pigeons and No-Rule-using humans, there are some very 
clear discrepancies between the pigeon data and that of 
either of the human groups. It is especially apparent that in 
incongruent trials, there is some switch cost in each of the 
human groups, which was also observed in Forrest et al.'s 
(2012) results. Even the human participants who were not 
using any rules exhibited some switch cost for the 
incongruent stimuli, yet the pigeons show no discernible 
trace of any such effect but are able to "task switch". Why is 
this? 
The most interesting possibility is that pigeons simply do 
not suffer from a switch cost in this paradigm. That is, when 
given a combination of component and biconditional 
discriminations, they do not exhibit any difficulty in 
switching from one hypothetical task to another, even in the 
case of the biconditional discrimination (i.e., the 
discrimination involving the incongruent stimuli). This 
result would imply that there is no switch cost in 
associatively-mediated task switching, and lead to the 
conclusion that the switch costs in all our human groups 
were due, in some sense, to contamination by rule use. This 
would fit rather well with theories that explain switch costs 
in terms of task-set reconfiguration (Monsell & Mizon, 
2006) but less well with theories that attempt to explain 
switch costs in associative terms (e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 
2003). A potential way of testing this assumption would be 
to compare the groups' performance when faced with novel 
stimuli in a generalization task.   
Another possibility would be that pigeons do exhibit 
switch costs in this paradigm, but that we either lack the 
power to detect it, or there is another factor masking it. The 
former possibility cannot be ruled out given that the 
predicted effect would be small, in any case, but there is 
simply no evidence of any switch cost to suggest that it 
would be worth running many more pigeons in an attempt to 
increase the power. The latter possibility is, however, worth 
investigating, especially if switch costs are potentially only 
present for incongruent stimuli while there will be little or 
no switch costs on congruent trials. A close examination of 
the paradigm reveals the possibility of an unwanted 
interaction between the difference between switch and 
repeat trials and a preference for novelty (e.g. in matching to 
sample, see Wright & Delius, 2005). Pigeons might 
preferentially respond to trials in which there is some 
change in stimulation (either in the form of a different 
stimulus or different response) compared to the previous 
trial, and avoid those in which both the stimulus and the 
response location are the same as in the preceding trial. The 
latter, for incongruent stimuli, is only possible on repeat 
trials, so, other things being equal, performance on those 
trials should then on average be worse than on switch trials. 
A disadvantage for repeat trials over switch trials for 
incongruent stimuli could potentially cancel out any switch 
costs in those trials, which by definition compose a 
disadvantage for switch trials over repeat trials. Whether 
this is the case or not is a matter for further empirical 
investigation. 
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